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INTRODUCTION

After almost ten years of negotiation, the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) finally adopted the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on April 30, 1982.' It was
opened for signature at Montego Bay, Jamaica, on December 10 of the
same year. As of January 18, 1984, 133 countries had signed the Convention and nine countries had ratified it. Under article 316-1 of the Convention, sixty ratifications are required for its entry into force. While it is not

t Updated version of a paper delivered at the Conference on Contemporary Issues of
International Law, June 26-28, 1984, in Taipei. See Bibliography: Delimitation of Exclusive
Economic Zone Boundaries Between Opposite and Adjacent States and the Gulf of Maine
Dispute, 9 MD. J. INT'L L. TRADE 181 (1985).

* LL.B., 1958, National Taiwan University; M.A., 1967, Long Island University; LL.M.,
1962, S.J.D., 1965, Harvard University; currently Professor of Law, University of Maryland
School of Law.
I. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 1261, 1271-1354 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Convention]; and THE LAW OF THE
SEA: OFFICIAL TEXT OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION

ON THE LAW OF THE SEA WITH

ANNEXES AND INDEX (C. Helm ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as LAW OF THE SEA].

2. 133 Have Signed Law of the Sea Convention, 21 U.N. CHRON. No. 2, 96 (1984).
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clear whether signatory countries will ratify the Convention, the fact that
many of them were willing to sign should give it "a certain provisional sta3
tus as a reflection of the views of the signatories."
Moreover, major countries which have so far refused to sign the Convention rely solely on the ground of their dissatisfaction with the deep-seabed mining arrangements of the Convention." They do not seem to challenge other parts of the Convention. For instance, in a statement on ocean
policy accompanying the U.S. proclamation on establishing an Exclusive
Economic Zone 5 issued on March 10, 1983, President Ronald Reagan
stated that the Convention "contains provisions with respect to traditional
uses of the oceans which generally confirm existing maritime law and practice and fairly balance the interests of all states . . ."; that the United
States is prepared to act in accordance with this balance of interests relating to traditional uses of the oceans which is reflected in the Convention;
and that the United States will exercise its navigational and overflight
rights on a worldwide basis "in a manner that is consistent with the balance
of interests reflected in the convention .. .6 Thus, as noted by a wellknown authority on the law of the sea, "these two documents simply mean
that the United States, though it did not sign the Convention, accepts its
provisions relating to traditional uses of the sea (i.e., other than those relating to the novel problem of deep seabed mining) as customary international
law binding on the United States."17 The Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan is a special case. It was unable to sign the Convention because of its
exclusion from the Conference at the insistence of the People's Republic of
China.8 The ROC took, however, a similar attitude toward the Convention
by accepting those parts of the Convention that codified customary international law. 9

3. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL

27, 100 (1970-1).

4. 19 U.N. CHRON. No. 6, 3, 16-17 (1982).
5. Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 1065 (1983), reprinted in 22 I.L.M. 464-65
(along with accompanying statement).
6. Id. at 464.
7. Sohn, Thoughts on Customary International Law, I RusK CENTER NEWSLETTER, 1, 2
(1984).
8. The ROC's seat at the United Nations was taken over by the PRC on October 26,
1971. From then on, the ROC has been unable to participate in any United Nations sponsored
international conferences. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1971, at 1, col. 4; 8 U.N. CHRON.
No. 10, 34 (1971).
9. See ROC Foreign Minister's statement of January 12, 1983 before the Legislative
Yuan, in Chiu, Chen, & Lee, Contemporary Practiceand Judicial Decisions of the Republic
of China Relating to InternationalLaw, 1981-1983, 2 CHINESE Y.B. INT'L L. & AFF. 228, 248
(1982). The minister stated the ROC would "comply with terms in principle." Id.
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Therefore, it appears that there is a general consensus among most
nations on the new Law of the Sea Convention, with the exception of those

parts of the Convention dealing with the deep seabed mining regime. This
paper will analyze some problems of applying those provisions of the Convention dealing with maritime boundary delimitation with respect to states

with adjacent or opposite coasts.
I1.

THE ADOPTION OF THE MARITIME BOUNDARY DELIMITATION
PROVISIONS AT THE UNCLOS III

Three articles deal with maritime boundary delimitation problems. Article 15 covers territorial seas,1" article 74 treats the exclusive economic
zone,' 1 and article 83 concerns the continental shelf between states with
opposite or adjacent coasts."2 Article 121 relating to the regime of islands is
also relevant to the delimitation problem. Among these articles, the adoption of articles 15 and 121 was not controversial at UNCLOS III. In fact,
the text of article 15 is substantially the same as article 12, paragraph 1 of
the 1958 Convention on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone:"3
Where the coasts of two States are opposite or adjacent to each other,
neither of the two States is entitled, failing agreement between them to
the contrary, to extend its territorial sea beyond the median line every
point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines
from which the breadth of the territorial seas of each of the two States
is measured. The above provision does not apply [The 1958 Convention
provides: "The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply. . . ."], however, where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special
circumstances to delimit the territorial seas of the two States, in a way

which is at variance with this provision.

"

While article 121 is new, there was little debate over the adoption of this

10. 1982 Convention, supra note I, at 1273, art. 15, reprintedin LAW OF THE SEA, supra
note 1,at 5-6.
II. 1982 Convention, supra note 1, at 1284, art 74, reprinted in LAW OF THE SEA, supra
note I, at 26.
12. 1982 Convention, supra note I, at 1286, art 83, reprinted in LAW OF THE SEA, supra
note 1, at 29-30.
13. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, opened for signature,
April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 212, art. 12, para. I [hereinafter cited as 1958 Territorial Sea Convention].
14. 1982 Convention, supra note I, at 1273, art. 15, reprinted in LAW OF THE SEA, supra
note 1, at 5-6.
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article. 15 Article 121 provides:
1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water,
which is above water or high tide.
2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf
of an island are determined in accordance with the provisions of
this Convention applicable to other land territory.
3. Rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of
their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental
shelf."
Articles 74 and 83, however, were subject to lengthy debate at UNCLOS III. The Conference ultimately took the position that these articles'
principles for delimitation of the continental shelf and exclusive economic
zone (EEZ) should be the same. One group of countries had favored drawing the line equidistant between the two shorelines in question, although
many of those countries contended that "special circumstances" might justify another method.17 Another group had wished to emphasize "equitable
principles" and "relevant circumstances."' 8 The Draft Convention on the
Law of the Sea (Informal Text) issued by the President of the Conference
on September 22, 1980 provides that the delimitation of maritime boundaries of the economic zone and the continental shelf between adjacent or
opposite countries "shall be effected by agreement in conformity with international law" and "such an agreement shall be in accordance with equitable principles, employing the median or equidistance line, where appropriate, and taking account of all circumstances prevailing in the area
concerned."' 19
Among the countries that favored the 1980 draft arrangement were
Canada, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, the Dominican
Republic, Ethiopia, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Portugal, the Republic of Korea, Sao Tome and Principe,
Spain, Sweden, the USSR, the United Arab Emirates and the United King-

15. See A/CONF.62/Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Official
Records, 2 UNCLOS II1 278-89 (1975).
16. 1982 Convention, supra note 1, at 1291, art. 121, reprinted in LAW OF THE SEA,
supra note 1, at 39.
17. See also Rhee, Equitable Solutions to the Maritime Boundary Dispute Between the
United States and Canada in the Gulf of Maine, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 590-628 (1981).
18. See U.N. Press Release, SEA/399, July 23, 1980, at 16.
19. Article 74, para. I (economic zone) and article 83, para. 1 (continental shelf) of the
Draft Convention. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev. 3, at 30, 34.
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dom. New Zealand favored an earlier formula presented at the informal
negotiation referring to equitable principles and citing the median line as
one method to be employed in appropriate cases. Kuwait and Peru also endorsed the equidistance principle."
Some of those states emphasizing "equitable principles" regarded the
1980 draft provision on delimitation as unacceptable. Among them were
Algeria, Argentina, the People's Republic of China, Democratic
Kampuchea, Ireland, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Morocco, Nicaragua, Poland,
Romania, Senegal, Somalia, Suriname, Syria, Turkey, and Venezuela.
They argued that delimitation should be based on agreement between the
states concerned and the application of equitable principles, taking into account all circumstances, and without prejudicing the methods to be utilized.
Some of them added first, that the text in the draft convention used terms
such as "relevant circumstances" that were open to misunderstanding and
would not help to avoid disputes, and secondly, that it was legally invalid,
since delimitation criteria already existed in international law. 1 Also favoring an emphasis on equitable principles were Bangladesh, Dominica, the
22
Ivory Coast, Mozambique, Vietnam and Zaire.
In an effort to remove the deadlock over the question, the President of
the Conference, Tommy T.K. Koh of Singapore, submitted a new compromise proposal at the Resumed Tenth Session in August 1981 which was
finally accepted by the Conference2 and became articles 74 and 83 of the
Convention. Article 74 provides:
The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone between states with
opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis
of international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable
24
solution.
Article 83 uses the same language as article 74 to deal with the delimita25
tion of "continental shelves."
This compromise proposal was acceptable to the group in favor of subscribing to "equitable principles" in resolving maritime boundary disputes
because it omitted the reference to the equidistance or median rule in the

20. U.N. Press Release, SEA/425, Mar. 4, 1981, at 24.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. U.N. Press Release, SEA/455, Aug. 28, 1981, at I.
24. 1982 Convention, supra note 1, at 1284, art. 74, reprintedin LAW
note I, at 26.
25. Id. at 29-30.

OF THE SEA,

supra
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text. According to this group, in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf
cases,2" the International Court of Justice (ICJ) referred to "equitable principles" as the rule for delimitation. Thus, the reference to article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice appears to support this group's
view because the Court's decision is at least a subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of international law.17 On the other hand, the text
only referred to the broad phrase "equitable solution" and not to "equitable
principles," so that it is also acceptable to the group in favor of the equidistance or median rule. 8 It will be demonstrated that the need to compromise
by adopting these two general articles relating to maritime boundary delimitation resulted in insufficiently clear guidelines for resolving various delimitation issues.

III.

A.

SELECTED PROBLEMS IN THE DELIMITATION OF MARITIME
BOUNDARIES

The Delimitation of TerritorialSeas Between States with Adjacent
or Opposite Coasts

Article 15 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea was derived from article 12 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone. 9 Forty-three countries including Western, Communist, and Third World nations, ratified the 1958 Convention." Only one
country, Venezuela, made reservations to article 12; however, Venezuela
did not challenge the principle contained in that article. Rather, it asserted
that certain sea areas around its coast should constitute "special circumstances" under that article, thus implying that the equidistance rule should
not be applied in that particular controversy. Moreover, none of the countries withholding ratification appears to have actively challenged article 12

26. North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3,
(Judgment of Feb. 20).
27. Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1179,
art. 38(d) [hereinafter cited as ICJ Statute].
28. This information was supplied by a delegate who participated in the negotiations.
Shen & Hsdi, Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and the Convention on
the Law of the Sea 2 CHUNG-KUO KUO-CHI-FA NIEN-K'AN [Chinese Yearbook of International
Law] 401, 418 (1983).
29. 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 13, at art. 12.
30. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as at December
1982, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/2 at 609. it listed 45 countries, but Byelorussia SSR,
Ukranian SSR and the Soviet Union are in fact one state, so they are counted as one state
here. While 66 nations signed the 1958 Convention, 23 did not ratify.
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of the Convention. Therefore, it may be argued that article 12 of the Con-

vention has received prior acquiescence in the international community.
This view is confirmed by the absence of challenge to the adoption of an
almost identical article at UNCLOS III.
Despite the historic sense of consensus on general principles underlying
the text of article 15 of the 1982 Convention, two questions remain to be
resolved in applying that article to actual cases of delimitation. One issue is
what constitutes "historical title" or "special circumstances" to exclude the
application of the equidistance rule in the delimitation of adjacent or opposite territorial seas. There is voluminous literature on the question of historical title on adjacent seas"' and countries can consult that corpus of literature for equitable and legal solutions. The "special circumstances" problem
is more difficult, however, because article 15 does not even provide a general guideline for determining what constitutes "special circumstances."
Furthermore, the paucity of scholarly discussion on the topic3" renders negotiations over potential disputes more difficult.
The second problem relating to the application of article 15 is that the
measurement of territorial sea is from the baseline 3 and not the shoreline 4
of the adjacent or opposite states. If one state's baseline encloses a large
area of the sea, this would in fact extend its territorial sea beyond the me-

31. See the literature cited in J. BOUCHEZ, THE REGIME OF BAYS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1964); and G.H. KNIGHT, THE LAW OF THE SEA: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND READINGS 582 (1980). See also Juridical Regime of Historical Waters, Including Historic Bays, Study
prepared by the Secretariat, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/143 (1962), excerpt reprinted in G. H.
KNIGHT, supra note 31, at 85-90.
32. Most discussions on "special circumstances" are related to the continental shelf. See,
e.g., T.L. McDORMAN, K. P. BEAUCHAMP & D. M. JOHNSTON, MARITIME BOUNDARY DELIMITATION,

78-87 (1983) [hereinafter cited as T. L.

MCDORMAN].

Only Dr. Derek W. Bowett discussed briefly the problem of islands as an example of
"special circumstances" in delimiting territorial sea boundaries with adjacent or opposite
states. He wrote:
There is evidence to suggest that islands might well be a typical example of "special
circumstances." Moreover, if one accepts the approach of the Arbitration Tribunal in the
U.K./France Channel Award, the notion of "special circumstances" embodies a general
appeal to equitable considerations rather than a notion of defined or limited categories of
such circumstances. It is unlikely that the reference to "special circumstances" will bear
in Article 12 of the Territorial Sea Convention a connotation different to that which it
bears in Article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention. Thus, the conclusion must be that
islands may well call for a departure from the equidistance boundary in the territorial sea
where equity so requires.
D.W. BOWETT, THE LEGAL REGIME OF ISLANDS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 35-36 (1979).
33. The baseline has been described as "the low-waterline as marked on large scale
charts." See G. H. KNIGHT, supra note 31, at 5-6 to 5-8.
34. The shoreline refers to the high-water line. Id.

MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE

8

[Vol. 9

dian line. However, article 7 of the 1982 Convention has provided detailed
rules on how straight baselines should be drawn for delimiting territorial
seas. According to paragraph I of this article, only "[i]n localities where
the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands
along the coast in its immediate vicinity," may the method of straight baseline be employed. Paragraph 3 further provides that "[t]he drawing of
straight baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general direction of the coasts, and the sea areas lying within the lines must be
sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of
internal waters."3' 5 Article 7, however, does not set the maximum length for
a straight baseline and this ambiguity may cause problems in applying this
article. 3 6
B.

The Delimitation of the Continental Shelf Between States with
Adjacent or Opposite Coasts

Article 83 of the 1982 Convention does not mention any specific rules
governing the delimitation of the continental shelf between states with opposite or adjacent coasts. It only vaguely provides that the delimitation
"shall be effected by agreement on the basis of international law, as referred to in article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in
order to achieve an equitable solution." Thus, in actual delimitation, one is
confronted with the crucial problem of how to determine the applicable
rules of international law.
According to article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, there are five sources of international law: (1) Treaties; (2) Customs; (3) General principles of law recognized by civilized nations; (4) Judicial decisions; and (5) Writers' views. The first three sources are usually
referred to as primary ones, while the last two are subsidiary. However, in
finding applicable rules in resolving the issue of delimitation of the continental shelf between states with opposite or adjacent coasts, the third principal source is largely irrelevant. The "general principles of law recognized
by civilized nations" usually are interpreted to mean that international law
can draw analogies from domestic legal systems, which are more developed. 37 Since the continental shelf is a relatively new concept, the domestic
legal systems have not yet worked out satisfactory rules for possible use in
international law, though some nations may face delimitation issues as be-

35. 1982 Convention, supra note 1, at 1272, art. 7, reprinted in LAW OF THE SEA, supra
,at 4.
36. For example, Ecuador set up a straight baseline of 136 miles, in disregard of the
direction of the seacoast. See G. H. KNIGHT, supra note 31, at 5-50 to 5-54.
37. See MANUAL OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 144 (M. Sorensen ed. 1968).
note
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tween political subdivisions. Ironically, some lawyers confronting domestic
problems related to delimitation have even relied on international law practice in suggesting their resolution in the domestic legal context.38 Nonetheless, article 83 of the 1982 Convention is simply too general to be useful in
most practical applications, with the exception that it establishes that the
goal of delimitation is to achieve an "equitable solution." There are, however, a number of bilateral treaties on delimitation of the continental shelf
between adjacent or opposite states which may be helpful in identifying a
trend of practice in this area. 9 With respect to international custom, in
order to ascertain the existence of applicable customary rules, one must
resort to judicial decisions, arbitral awards and writers' views. Thus, these
so-called subsidiary sources of international law are playing a dominant
role, by default, in identifying applicable customary rules in the delimitation of the continental shelf between states of opposite or adjacent coasts.
It is generally agreed that there are two ICJ decisions and one arbitral
award which provide some guidance in the delimitation of continental shelf
problems. The first relevant decision is the North Sea Continental Shelf
cases, decided by the ICJ in 1969.40 In North Sea, the Court laid down the
following principles for delimiting the continental shelf between adjacent
states:
1. delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, and taking account of all the relevant circumstances, in such a way as to leave as much as possible to each Party
all those parts of the continental shelf that constitute a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea, without encroachment on the natural prolongation of the land territory of the
other;
2. if, in the application of the preceding sub-paragraph, the delimitation leaves to the Parties areas that overlap, these are to be divided
between them in agreed proportions or, failing agreement, equally,
unless they decide on a regime of joint jurisdiction, user, or exploitation for the zones of overlap or any part of them;
[I]n the course of the negotiations, the factors to be taken into account
are to include:
1. the general configuration of the coasts of the Parties, as well as the
presence of any special or unusual features;

38. See, e.g., Charney, The Delimitation of Lateral Seaward Boundaries Between States
in a Domestic Context, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 28-68 (1981).
39. For a list of those agreements, see T. L. McDORMAN, supra note 32, at 158-95.
40. 1969 I.C.J. 3.
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so far as known or readily ascertainable, the physical and geological structure, and natural resources, of the continental shelf areas
involved;
3. the element of a reasonable degree of proportionality, which a delimitation carried out in accordance with equitable principles ought
to bring about between the extent of the continental shelf areas
appertaining to the coastal State and the length of its coast measured in the general direction of the coastline, account being taken
for this purpose of the effects, actual or prospective, of any other
continental shelf delimitations between adjacent States in the same
region."'

2.

While the North Sea Continental Shelf cases provide guidelines for
delimiting the continental shelf between adjacent states, it is not clear
whether the principles enunciated in this case are applicable to delimiting
the continental shelf of states with opposite coasts. Moreover, the case does
not discuss the question of islands in the delimitation issue. These questions
were discussed in the 1977 Anglo-French Arbitral Award on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf.4 2 Under article 121, paragraph 3 of the 1982
Convention, only "rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own" cannot serve as a basis for claiming an economic
zone or continental shelf. In other words, an island, as a matter of principle,
can have an economic zone or continental shelf. However, under certain
circumstances, inequitable results will arise from giving full effect to an
island in delimitation. In the Anglo-French Arbitral Award, the tribunal
also addressed these issues.
In that case, because both France and the United Kingdom were parties to the 1958 Convention on Continental Shelf,4" the Arbitral Tribunal
considered article 6 of the Convention applicable. On its face, that article
seems to give preference to the median or equidistance rule. Paragraphs 1
and 2 provide that, in the case of opposite or adjacent coasts, the boundary
of the continental shelf shall be determined by the agreement between the
nations. In the absence of an agreement, and unless another line is justified
by special circumstances, the boundary is the median or equidistance line.
However, the Arbitral Tribunal considered that both "the equidistance-special circumstances rule [provided in Article 6 of the 1958 Convention] and

41. 1969 I.C.J. at 53-54 (para. 101).
42. Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (U.K. v. Fr.) reprinted in 18 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 3, 54 i.L.R. I1 (Ct. Art. 1977).
43. Convention on the Continental Shelf, openedfor signature April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
471, T.I.A.S. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter cited as 1958 Convention].
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the rules of customary law [stated by the Court in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases] have the same object-the determination of the boundary
in accordance with equitable principles." The Tribunal further observed
that "in the present case, whether discussing the application of Article 6 or
the position under customary law, both parties have had free recourse to
pronouncements of the International Court of Justice regarding the rules of
customary law applicable in the matter ...."" In other words, the Arbitral
tribunal confirmed the customary rules stated by the ICJ in the North Sea
Continental Shelf cases as applicable to this case of delimiting the continental shelf between states of opposite coasts.
In addition, unlike the North Sea Continental Shelf cases, the Arbitral
Tribunal in the Anglo-French Arbitral Award was confronted with the
problem of islands in delimitation. It took the position that if an island
would cause a disproportionate effect in delimitation, then this would constitute a "special circumstance" and thus the island should not be given full
effect in delimitation in order to avoid an "inequitable" result. 6 It also
awarded a delimitation line between the two countries.
The third case concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf
arose between Tunisia and Libya, and was decided by the International
Court of Justice on February 24, 1982.4" This decision further clarified certain principles relating to the delimitation of the continental shelf.4 7 In contrast to the 1969 North Sea ContinentalShelf cases, which merely enunciated certain principles of delimitation and let the parties concerned
negotiate the lines themselves, the ICJ determined a continental shelf
boundary between the two countries as it had done in the 1977 AngloFrench Arbitral Award. With respect to the Tunisian Kerkennah Islands,
the ICJ drew on the approach of the 1977 Arbitral Tribunal in not giving
full effect to these islands in delimitation. 8
It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss various aspects of the
two ICJ decisions and the one arbitral award, but these cases do indicate
that it is possible to ascertain certain customary rules of international law
in resolving the question of the delimitation of the continental shelf between
states of adjacent or opposite coasts. Moreover, a voluminous corpus of

44. See 18 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 47-48 (para. 75), 54 I.L.R. at 57-58.
45. See 18 R. Int'l Arb. Awards at 114-15 (paras. 244 and 245), 54 I.L.R. at 121-22.
46. 1982 I.C.J. 18.
47. See Feldman, The Tunisia-Libya ContinentalShelf Case: Geographic Justice or Judicial Compromise? 77 Am.J.INT'L L. 219-38 (1983); Dunning, InternationalCourt of Justice Judgment of February 24, 1982: Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan
Arab Jamahiriya)4 OCEAN Y.B. 515-20 (1983).
48. See 1982 I.C.J. at 88-89 (para. 128).
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literature,4' 9 and many bilateral agreements to delimit maritime boundaries,
especially the continental shelf boundary, exist.5 0 These two sources of information can thus be consulted in dealing with an actual delimitation case.
C.

The Delimitation of Economic Zones and Its Relation to the
Delimitation of the Continental Shelf

The text of article 74 of the 1982 Convention on the delimitation of
exclusive economic zones is exactly the same as that of article 83 on the
continental shelf. However, the only case relating to this issue arose between the United States and Canada concerning the maritime boundary in
the Gulf of Maine, and was decided by a Chamber of the ICJ on October
12, 1984.51 Moreover, most literature on maritime boundaries focuses on
the continental shelf. In view of this scarcity of decisions and commentary,
the following discussion is primarily limited to the issues involved in the
delimitation of economic zones rather than to solutions of the problem.
Unlike the concept of the continental shelf, which is based on the geographical situation of the seabed, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) arbitrarily sets a limit of 200 miles from the baseline of a coastal state. This
regime was originally advocated by certain Latin American states such as
Chile, Peru or Ecuador which have almost no continental shelf. Indeed, one
commentator has noted that in the early stages of the UNCLOS III, the
trend was for the continental shelf regime to be absorbed within the 200mile limit of the EEZ.5 2 However, the broad-shelf countries, such as the
United States, Australia, the Soviet Union, and Argentina, managed to reverse this trend. The 1982 Convention now allows a coastal state to extend
its continental shelf beyond the 200-mile limit as far as 350 miles.5 3 This
parallel system of EEZ and continental shelf, however, creates a difficult
problem with regard to delimitation between states of opposite coasts.
If the distance between two states with opposite coasts is more than
400 miles and there exists a continental shelf between them, then the delim-

49. See sources cited in T. L. McDORMAN, supra note 32; Charney, Ocean Boundaries
Between Nations: A Theory for Progress, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 582-605 (1984); Collins & Rogoff, The InternationalLaw of Maritime Boundary Delimitation, 34 ME. L. REV. 1-62 (1982).
50. See, e.g., the list of such agreements cited in T.L. McDORMAN, supra note 32, at 15895.
51. Case Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area
(Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Judgment of Oct. 12), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1197 (1984).
For a summary of the case, see the Communique released by the I.C.J., in 28 INT'L PRAC.
NOTEBOOK 11-16 (Oct. 1984).
52. See I D. P. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 579 (1982).
53. 1982 Convention, supra note 1, at 1285, art. 76, para. 6, reprinted in LAW OF THE
SEA, supra note 1, at 27.
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itation issue can be resolved by resorting to the rules discussed in the previous section. If the distance between them is less than 400 miles, however,
then the situation is more complicated. If both states have declared an
EEZ, and both have agreed to disregard the continental shelf between
them, then the issue may not be difficult to resolve. But if one state's shelf
extends beyond the median line of the two opposite states' coasts, can that
state still exercise sovereign rights over that part of the shelf as provided in
article 77, paragraph 1, of the 1982 Convention? 5 '
Since the regime of the continental shelf emerged earlier than that of
5
55
the EEZ, and since under the 1958 Convention, the 1982 Convention 1
and writers' views,5 7 "the rights of the coastal State over the continental
shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any express
proclamation,"58 it is unlikely that a coastal state would give up its claim to
its continental shelf beyond the median line of two states with opposite
coasts. On the other hand, under article 56, paragraph 1, of the 1982 Convention, a coastal state has "sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring
and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed
and its subsoil . .. .,"9 so it is unlikely that a state would allow an opposite
state to claim the continental shelf under its EEZ.
One possible solution is to absorb the regime of the continental shelf
within 200 miles into the EEZ. Thus, if the distance between two states
with opposite coasts is less than 400 miles, then the EEZ should be delimited regardless of the continental shelf between them. Professor Shigeru
Oda of Japan appears to favor this view. 60
On the other hand, a state with a broad shelf vis-a-vis an opposite state
is likely to oppose this view. Under such circumstances, it is possible for
that state not to declare an EEZ, but to base its claim exclusively on the
doctrine of the continental shelf. Moreover, even if a state makes a declaration on an EEZ, it can still assert its rights on a continental shelf based on

54. Id. at 28.
55. See 1958 Convention, supra note 43, at art. 2, para. 3.
56. 1982 Convention, supra note 1.
57. None of the writers appears to oppose article 2, paragraph 3 of the 1958 Convention.
See, e.g., Collins & Rogoff, supra note 49; Evensen, The Delimitationof Exclusive Economic
Zones and Continental Shelves as Highlighted by the International Court of Justice, in THE
NEW LAW OF THE SEA 107-54 (C. J. Rozakis & C.A. Stephanou eds. 1983).
58. 1982 Convention, art. 77, para. 3, supra note 1, at 1285, reprinted in LAW OF THE
SEA, supra note I at 28.
59. 1982 Convention, art. 56, para. 1, supra note 1, at 1280, reprinted in LAW OF THE
SEA, supra note 1, at 18.
60. S. ODA, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE RESOURCES OF THE SEA 93 (1979).
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conventional and customary rules of international law. For instance, when
the Republic of China made a declaration on its economic zone on September 6, 1979, it specifically pointed out:
The sovereign rights enjoyed by the Republic of China over the continental shelf contiguous to its coast as recognized by the Convention on
the Continental Shelf of 1958 and the general principles of international law shall not be prejudiced in any manner by the proclamation of
the present exclusive economic zone or the establishment of such zones
by any other state.6 1
Another solution is to have different maritime boundary lines for EEZ
and the continental shelf. For instance, in the hearing on the Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libya) on October 9, 1981, Libya expressed the following view:
Libya considers that, as between States with opposite or adjacent
coasts, the delimitation of their respective continental shelf areas and of
their economic zones ought not, in the majority of cases, to be different.
Nevertheless, there may be factors relevant to fishing, such as established fishing practices, which have no relevance to shelf resources; and,
conversely, there may be factors relevant to shelf resources-such as
geological features controlling the extent of a natural prolongation-of
no relevance to fishing. It therefore follows that the two boundaries
need not necessarily coincide.6"
In actual cases of delimitation, a few states have agreed to have two different maritime boundary lines for different purposes. For instance, in the
Treaty between Papua and New Guinea and Australia concluded on December 8, 1978, the fisheries-jurisdiction line does not correspond to the
63
seabed and subsoil boundary.
Another problem relating to the delimitation of EEZs is the extent to
which existing rules of international law, especially those relating to the
delimitation of continental shelf, can mutatis mutandis be applied to the
delimitation of the EEZ. Since the EEZ concept disregards the seabed's
geographical or geological situation, there seems to be a natural limit to
drawing analogies from rules of continental shelf delimitation to apply to
the EEZ case. On the other hand, there are also similarities that may jus-

61. Chiu, Chen & Lee, supra note 9, at 248-56.
62. 1982 I.C.J. at 232 (dissenting opinion of Judge Shigeru Oda) (emphasis added).
63. See T.L. McDORMAN, supra note 32, at 194-95.
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tify such analogies. For instance, on the question of to what extent an island
should be given effect in delimitation, drawing analogies from the continental shelf delimitation experience certainly may prove useful.
While the above discussion is limited to the case of states with opposite
coasts, to a certain extent the delimitation of EEZs between adjacent states
may involve similar difficulties, especially in mixed delimitation cases involving EEZs and the continental shelf.
In the 1984 Gulf of Maine Maritime Boundary Case,64 both the
United States and Canada, as adjacent states, requested a Chamber of the
ICJ to decide a single maritime boundary covering both the continental
shelf and the superjacent fisheries zones. The ICJ Chamber noted that certain provisions concerning the continental shelf and the exclusive economic
zone of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea were
adopted without any objections and thus "may be regarded as consonant at
present with general international law on the question."6 It also pointed
out that despite the fact that both countries are contracting parties to the
1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, 6 such a treaty obligation concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf does not apply by its ex67
plicit terms to superjacent waters.
With respect to the applicable criteria and methods in delimitation, the
Chamber considered that it must exclude criteria which, however equitable
they may appear in themselves, are not suited to the delimitation of both of
the two objects in respect of which the delimitation is requested-the continental shelf and the fishery zones.6 8 Thus, it stated:
[A] delimitation which has to apply at one and the same time to
the continental shelf and to the superjacent water column can only be
carried out by the application of a criterion, or combination of criteria,
which does not give preferential treatment to one of these two objects
to the detriment of the other, and at the same time is such as to be
equally suitable to the division of either of them. In that regard
. ..preference will. . . inevitably be given to criteria that, because of
their more neutral character, are best suited for use in a multi-purpose
delimitation .69

64. 1984 I.C.J. 246.
65. 1984 I.C.J. at 294 (para. 94).
66.
67.
68.
69.

See 1958 Convention, supra note 43.
1984 I.C.J. at 291 (para. 84).
Id. at 326 (para. 192).
Id. at 327 (para. 194).
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In view of these reasons, the Chamber turned to criteria derived from
geography, concluding that it should favor the criterion whereby one should
aim at an equal division of areas where the maritime projections of the
coasts of the states between which delimitation is to be effectively covered
overlap. However, "the adoption of this starting-point must be combined
with the parallel and partial adoption of the appropriate auxiliary criteria
insofar as it is apparent that this combination is necessitated by the relevant circumstances of the area concerned, and provided they are used only
7' 0
to the extent actually dictated by this necessity."
One of the relevant circumstances indicated by the Chamber is
whether there is "significant inequality in the lengths of the two States'
respective coastlines abutting on the delimitation areas."71 Another relevant
circumstance is the presence of islands. Like the court in the 1982 Tunisial
the Chamber gave a Canadian island only
Libya Continental Shelf case,
72
half effect in delimitation.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The provisions on delimitation of the exclusive economic zone/continental shelf between states with opposite or adjacent coasts in the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea are too general and
therefore give rise to some difficult problems in their application to a concrete case. Moreover, the Convention fails to deal with the problem of the
relationship between EEZs and the regime of the continental shelf. As a
matter of fact, the UNCLOS III did not even discuss this issue and the UN
Secretariat also did not provide any background analysis for the Conference
participants.
Some rules of practices relating to the delimitation of the continental
shelf between states of adjacent or opposite coasts can be, mutatis mutandis, applied to the delimitation of EEZs. Such rules, however, as stated by
the ICJ Chamber in the 1984 Gulf of Maine Maritime Boundary Delimitation, are not necessarily suitable to a case delimiting a single maritime
boundary for both the continental shelf and the EEZ.
In the 1984 Gulf of Maine Maritime Boundary Delimitation, the ICJ
Chamber suggested a simple geographical approach to the multi-purpose
delimitation case. The Chamber in fact suggested using a median rule, or
an equidistance rule, in cases of opposite states, subject to the adjustment of
this rule in the relevant circumstances, such as the proportionality of the

70. Id. at 328 (para. 197) (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 335 (para. 218).
72. Id. at 336-37 (paras. 221-22).

19851

UNCLOS Ill DELIMITATION PROVISIONS

length of the coastlines of delimiting states or the presence of islands, in
order to achieve an equitable solution as required by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This approach has the merit of
presenting a simple and practical solution to a difficult and complicated
case of delimiting a single boundary for both the continental shelf and the
EEZ. Although the ICJ Chamber was composed of Western judges only,"3
under article 27 of the ICJ Statute, a judgment given by a Chamber "shall
be considered as rendered by the Court." Therefore, its impact on the development of international law should be the same.
Finally, assuming the ICJ Chamber rule is accepted as a principle of
international law, there remains the question of delimiting the maritime
boundary line between a state with an EEZ and a state with a continental
shelf but without a declared EEZ. Recently the International Law Association (ILA) decided to form a Committee on the Exclusive Economic Zone
to study this emerging regime, including the relationship between the EEZ
and the continental shelf."4 Hopefully the ILA study and more research by
scholars will clarify some of the difficult issues raised in this paper.

73. Judges Ago (Italy), Gros (France), Mosler .(Federal Republic of Germany), Schwebel
(U.S.) and Cohen (Canadian Judge ad hoc) comprised the panel.
74. See INT'L L. Ass'N REPORT OF THE SIXTIETH CONFERENCE HELD AT MONTREAL
(AUGUST 29-SEPTEMBER 4, 1982) 303-24 (1983). See generally Rhee, supra note 17.

